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ReplicationHumans form impressions andmake social judgments about others based on information that is quickly and eas-
ily available, such as facial and vocal traits. The evolutionary function of impression formation and social judg-
ment mechanisms have received limited attention in psychology research; we argue that their function is to
accurately forecast the behavior of others. There is some evidence for the predictive accuracy of social judgments,
but much of it comes from situationswhere there is little incentive to deceive, which limits applicability to ques-
tions of the function of such mechanisms. A classic experiment that avoids this problemwas conducted by R. H.
Frank, T. Gilovich, and D. T. Regan (1993); their participants predicted each other's Prisoner's Dilemma Game de-
cisions with above-chance accuracy after a short interaction period, knowing the game would follow. We report
three original studies that replicate these aspects of themethods of Frank et al. (1993) and reanalyze data from all
known replications. Our meta-analysis of these studies conﬁrms the original report: humans can predict each
other's Prisoner's Dilemma decisions after a brief interaction with people who have incentive to deceive.and Center for
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How dowe assess our social partners? Psychology literatures on im-
pression formation (Albright, Kenny, &Malloy, 1988; Eyal, Hoover, Fujita,
& Nussbaum, 2011; Forgas, 2011; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987), personality
judgment (Funder, 2012; Oh, Wang, & Mount, 2011), and thin slicing
(Ambady, Conner, & Hallahan, 1999; Ambady & Gray, 2002; Ambady
& Rosenthal, 1992; Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner,
2004; Willis & Todorov, 2006) have established that humans form im-
pressions of others, that we do so quickly and with limited information,
that our impressions match the impressions of others, and that these
impressions can have predictive value.
However, why do we form these impressions? How do our assess-
ments affect our social lives? What is the evolutionary function
(Tinbergen, 1963) of these mechanisms, i.e., how do their effects on
our social lives affect our reproductive success? Such questions have re-
ceived less attention. For the most part, psychological research has fo-
cused on elucidating the mechanisms that produce judgments
(Funder, 2012), giving less consideration to the adaptive signiﬁcance
of such judgments (e.g. Eyal et al., 2011; Forgas, 2011). Evenwhen func-
tion is considered, as when evaluating the relationship between judge
and target (discussed below), the discussion is often at the level ofBehavior, Evolu-
USA.
.ca (T. Burleigh),
en access article underinternal proximate mechanisms (e.g. resolving contradictory internal
assessments; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987, pp 432-433) rather than on the
level of solutions to strategic problems that may be favored by selection
(e.g. the problem of predicting a potential social partner's behavior).
Function-focused research about assessing others should seek to
characterize the relationship between a judge's impression of a target
and the target's future behavior. Predicting people's future behavior is
an important sub-problemof the broader task ofmaking good social de-
cisions. However, “accuracy” in the study of personality judgement and
thin slices is most often operationalized as agreement between the
judge's rating of a target and the target's self-rating or as agreement
among multiple judges (e.g. Albright et al., 1988; Ambady & Rosenthal,
1993; Ambady & Gray, 2002); rarely is the “gold standard” of accurate
behavior prediction employed (Funder, 2012). When the gold standard
is used or discussed, it often takes the form of personality judgments
correlating with behaviors of the targets (e.g. Fast & Funder, 2008;
Hepler & Albarracín, 2013; Oh et al., 2011; Ozer & Benet-Martínez,
2006; Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013), rather than behavioral
predictions about the targets corresponding to behaviors of the targets.
In sum, it appears that little recent psychology research about how we
make impressions of others explicitly considers whether we can and
do use impressions to accurately predict people's behavior, and thus
such research sheds little direct light on the evolutionary importance
of such predictive ability.
Function-focused research should also approach this problem differ-
ently by considering the strategic interests of the judge and the target. Is
it in the interests of the target to be accurately evaluated? How can thethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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is inﬂuenced by motivation and outcome dependency (e.g. De Melo,
Carnevale, Read, & Gratch, 2014; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Pelham &
Neter, 1995) begin to consider strategic interests, but for the most
part functional issues are seldom addressed. Efforts to situate assess-
ment mechanisms in their social context, such as by considering how
the relationship between the judge and the target affects the assess-
ment, are rare (Fiske & Dépret, 1996). Indeed, a recent review paper
on the accuracy of personality judgments (Funder, 2012) discusses
what makes “good judges”without consideringmotivation or incentive
to judge the target correctly, and what makes “good targets” without
considering the target's strategic interest to inform or deceive the judge.
A great deal of evolutionary literature on the psychology of social be-
havior is devoted to the issue of how humans use information about
past behavior to inform social decision-making (reviewed by Barclay,
2015). However how do people make judgments when such informa-
tion is unavailable? Recent evolutionary psychology research has
established that thin slice information can be used to accurately predict
incentivized social behavior, such as vocal characteristics predicting ag-
gression (Puts, Apicella, & Cárdenas, 2011; Sell et al., 2010) and facial
features or expressions predicting cooperation and honesty (e.g.
Brown, Palameta, & Moore, 2003; Fetchenhauer, Groothuis, & Pradel,
2010; Haselhuhn & Wong, 2011; Little et al., 2013; Oda, Naganawa,
Yamauchi, Yamagata, & Matsumoto-Oda, 2009; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010;
Tognetti, Berticat, Raymond, & Fauire, 2013; Verplaetse, Vanneste, &
Braeckman, 2007; Verplaetse & Vanneste, 2010). These studies consider
the strategic interests of the targets by assessing their behavior in the
context of real social interactions, often operationalized as cooperate/
defect decisions in economic games. Much of this literature is explicitly
anchored by theoretical consideration of the functional signiﬁcance of
the mechanisms being investigated, such as harnessing the beneﬁts of
repeated mutual cooperation and avoiding the costs of interacting
with non-cooperators, and related problems (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989).
However, we note two shortcomings of many these evolutionary
studies. First, they involve presenting images or video of target individ-
uals whose behavior will be predicted (see also: Kiyonari, 2010; Vogt,
Efferson, & Fehr, 2013), rather than making predictions in the more
ecologically-valid context of a face-to-face encounter. Second, many
methods (see also: DeSteno et al., 2012; Manson, Gervais, & Kline,
2013) do not consider all strategic interests because they involve situa-
tions in which non-cooperators had little incentive to present them-
selves as cooperative because the games were unannounced (i.e.
participants did not know a cooperation/defection decision would fol-
low; Kiyonari, 2010). In reality, would-be defectors beneﬁt from
appearing cooperativewhen interactingwith partners; accurate predic-
tion under such circumstances is important to questions of function be-
cause many forms of human cooperation are explicitly negotiated.
In light of these concerns with both the social psychology literatures
on impression formation, personality judgment, and thin slices, and the
evolutionary literature on mechanisms for predicting social behavior, it
is important to seek evidence for the accuracy of (1) incentivized pre-
dictions of (2) incentivized behavior (3) when the target has incentive
to deceive the judge. Such evidence is crucial to any argument that so-
cial judgments are of practical consequence and crucial to evaluating
models of the evolutionary origins of cooperation (Kiyonari, 2010).
Evidence meeting the criteria above was provided by Frank,
Gilovich, and Regan (1993), who showed that previously unacquainted
people can predict the decisions of others in a Prisoner's DilemmaGame
(henceforth “PDG”) after 30 minutes of face-to-face interaction during
which they knew PDGs would follow. In a PDG, two players each have
a choice of cooperating with their partner or defecting on her. Each
player's individual payoff is higher if she chooses to defect, but choosing
to cooperate improves the partner's payoff such that mutual coopera-
tion results in the highest combined outcome. Thus when negotiating
with a PDG partner prior to the game, would-be defectors have incen-
tive to deceptively present themselves as cooperators in attempt toinduce cooperation from the partner. Accordingly, would-be coopera-
tors have incentive to detect deception to avoid the “sucker's payoff”
(Table 1).
PDGs are widely used tomodel social interactions and the evolution
of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Boyd & Lorberbaum, 1987; Brembs,
1996; Dawkins, 1976/2006; Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009; Nowak &
Sigmund, 1992, 1993; Wilson, 1971). Evidence about the psychology
of this game is an important test of such models. The PDG prediction
ability reported by Frank et al. (1993) has received modest but steady
attention in the literature on cooperation (e.g. as of November 3, 2015
Google Scholar citation count is 276), especially the literature on
cheater detection (e.g. DeSteno et al., 2012; Little, Jones, DeBruine, &
Dunbar, 2013; Sylwester, Lyons, Buchanan, Nettle, & Roberts, 2012).
Frank et al. (1993) have also been cited in studies of sociopathy
(Mealy, 1995), morality and fairness (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber,
2013), determinants of cooperation (Fischer, 2009), interdependence
theory (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003), and the applicability of rational
choice theory to understanding social interactions (Colman, 2003). As
argued above, the empirical ﬁndings of Frank et al. are broadly relevant
to studies of impression formation, personality judgment and thin slice
judgments because they provide supportive evidence of a function of
suchmechanisms: to accurately forecast the behavior of our (potential)
social partners.
Conﬁdence in research ﬁndings is enhanced by independent replica-
tion, robust statistical analysis, and conﬁrmatory meta-analysis. Brosig
(2002) reported a successful replication of Frank et al. (1993) but did
not analyze all relevant data and did not control for non-
independence of observations. Reed, Zeglen, and Schmidt (2012) also
reported a successful replication, but their report largely focussed on
other results. In this paper we present our own research that replicates
Frank et al. and controls for non-independent observations. We also re-
analyze Brosig's data and present ameta-analysis of all available studies
in which participants predicted each other's PDG decisions after an ac-
quaintance period preceding an announced game. To be clear, our
focus here is not on the speciﬁc theoretical ideas of Frank et al. (1993)
regarding the evolution of one-shot cooperation (see Manson et al.,
2013, for a nice review); rather, our focus is on evaluating evidence
that people can accurately predict each other's PDGdecisionsdespite in-
centives to deceive.
2. Methods
2.1. Overview
The ﬁrst of three new studies we report here was designed as a pilot
test of methods then intended to replicate and extend Frank et al.
(1993). We used a slightly modiﬁed version of their methods as our
control condition, expecting to observe similar predictive accuracy,
and we expected to observe greater predictive accuracy in our experi-
mental condition. We found no evidence of above-chance prediction
in the control or experimental conditions; thus there was no direct
test of our prediction and no replication of the original results.Wonder-
ing if minor method differences might explain the null replication, we
designed the second study as a more precise replication. A third study
was designed primarily to test whether PDG defection is correlated
with outcomes of other tasks (results reported elsewhere; Sparks et al.
in review), but we asked participants to predict each other's decisions
to provide data relevant to the current investigation.
So, we conducted three studies that shared the following aspects of
Frank et al. (1993), Brosig (2002) and Reed et al (2012): Student partic-
ipants came to a laboratory, received an overview of the PDG, spent
some time talking to their PDG partner(s), and then played a PDG
with one or more partners and tried to predict the decisions of the part-
ner(s). Our method details are publicly available (Sparks, Burleigh, &
Barclay, 2015). The goal of this report is to evaluate data from all six of
these studies about the accuracy of PDG predictions. Do the collective
Table 1
Methods discrepancies.
Discrepancy Frank et al. Brosig Reed et al. Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
Acquainted participants
Identiﬁed? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
By whom? Participant Participant Participant Experimenter – –
Anonymity
PDG decisions revealed? No No No No No Yes
Conﬁdence in prediction
Measure included? Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scale 50 to 100 – 1 to 7 50 to 100 50 to 100 0 to 100
Sample size
Number of participants 99 143 158 60 84 158
Predictions per player 2 3 1 2 or 3 2 1 or 2
predictions 198 394 158 168 167 283
Interaction structure
Time (minutes) 30 10 10 25 30 10 to 20
Group size 3 2 2 3 or 4 3 2 or 3
PDG payoff parameters
T 3 40 6 3 4 4
R 2 24 4 2 2.25 2.25
P 1 8 2 1 1.5 1.5
S 0 −8 0 0 0 0
Experimental condition No No No Yes Yes No
Summary of the differences inmethods between studies, as discussed inmain text and supplement. Sample size. Some participants' predictions were disqualiﬁed or missing, so total pre-
dictions is not always an exact multiple of participants and predictions per player. Interaction structure. Participants interacted before predicting each other's decisions. Brosig's partici-
pants had multiple paired interactions. Participants in other studies had a single interaction in groups of sizes 2, 3 or 4. PDG parameters. The payoff when a defector plays a cooperator
is T (“Temptation to defect”) for the defector and S (“Sucker's payoff”) for the cooperator. Mutual cooperation pays R (“Reward for mutual cooperation”) to each player. Mutual defection
pays P (“Punishment for mutual defection”) to each player. A Prisoner's Dilemma exists whenever payoffs are such that T N R N P N S and 2R N T + S. Units for Frank et al. and Reed et al.
are USD. Units for Brosig are “lab dollars” convertible to DM at 4:1. Units for our studies are CAD.
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after a brief interaction in which they have incentive to deceive
each other?
2.2. Major methods differences
Somemethods differences are inevitable in replication. Table 1 sum-
marizes the most important differences among studies providing data
on the accuracy of PDG predictions. These discrepancies should not ob-
scure the fundamental similarity of these methods as described above.
In the sections below,we discuss the relevance ofmajormethodological
differences to our analyses and interpretation of the prediction data.
Minor differences are discussed in the supplementary material.
2.2.1. Previous acquaintance of participants
Frank et al. (1993) and Reed et al. (2012) ensured that their partici-
pants were previously unacquainted. Brosig (2002) collected data on
acquainted participants but excluded their predictions from her report-
ed analyses. Previous acquaintance was not relevant to the hypotheses
our methods were originally designed to test, so we only systematically
collected acquaintance data in study 1 (based on experimenter observa-
tion) and never screened participants on this basis. In study 1, 11.9% of
games were played between acquainted participants; studies 2 and 3
drew from the same participant pool and we have no reason to suspect
major differences. Thus, we expect that all of our studies included a mi-
nority of acquainted participants.
The challenge ofmakingdecisions involvingnovel partners is related
to the challenge of making decisions involving known partners in novel
settings—reputation information is either unavailable or of unclear
value. As it is quite unlikely that acquainted participants in our studies
have ever played a formal PDG with each other, they are likely in a
novel social context. Obviously a data set that includes predictions of
previously-acquainted participants has limited value for addressing
the speciﬁc question investigated by Frank et al. (1993): can people dis-
tinguish cooperators from defectors based only on a brief interaction?
But such data do provide information about a related and more general
question: Can people predict social decisions of others in the absence of
information about their past behavior in the same social context? Theextent to which the latter question informs the former depends on
whether previous acquaintance alters predictive accuracy. We see no
clear a priori prediction on the matter. Recall the Godfather's advice:
“keep your friends close but your enemies closer” (Coppola, F.F. (Pro-
ducer, & Director), 1974), i.e. people who know each other well can
apply that knowledge towards cooperative coordination or towards ex-
ploitative deception (see Sylwester et al., 2012).
In an effort to shed light on how previous acquaintance affects pre-
dictive accuracy, we report separate analyses of acquainted participants
when possible—for our reanalysis of Brosig's data and for our study 1.
We also re-computed our primary analyses with these acquainted
sub-samples removed.
2.2.2. Anonymity
If a PDG is certain to be an isolated event—a one-shot interaction—
defection is the dominant strategy and is favored by natural selection.
However, if the outcome of one game can affect future social interac-
tions (with the same partner or others) natural selection can favor
the evolution of cooperative strategies (Delton, Krasnow, Tooby, &
Cosmides, 2011). A common method for implementing one-shot
games in experimental settings is ensuring anonymity such that
participants' decisions cannot be known to other participants or to
the experimenter with whom participants directly interact. But, it is
unclear that participants regard such games as truly one-shot (Hagen
& Hammerstein, 2006).
Experimenter guarantees of anonymity and one-shot interaction
may be considered a cue that the current interaction is unlikely to
have reputational consequence for any future interactions. However,
such guarantees are not the only cues used to gauge reputational conse-
quences. For example, a growing literature shows that an invalid cue to
observation—images of eyes rather than real watching eyes— increase
cooperativeness, even in effectively one-shot settings (reviewed by
Sparks & Barclay, 2013 and Nettle et al., 2013). This suggests that such
cues increase the estimated likelihood that the current interaction
may have reputation-mediated consequences for future interactions,
contrary to anonymity promises by experimenters. If exposure to im-
ages of eyes, or even images bearing only a crude resemblance to eyes
(Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009), can make otherwise
Table 2
QIC values for the data-cluster models.
Study Data-cluster model QIC value
Study 1 Guesser 208.94
Player⁎ 208.74
Study 2 Guesser⁎ 206.30
Player 209.50
Study 3 Guesser⁎ 236.03
Player 238.99
Brosig (2002) Guesser⁎ 529.63
Player 533.29
⁎ The selected model.
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minutes of face-to-face conversation between students at the same uni-
versity could have a similar effect. Participants in Frank et al. (1993),
Brosig (2002), Reed et al. (2012) and our studies 1 and 2 are likely to
have assessed (perhaps implicitly) that there was a non-zero chance
that their PDG decisions could inﬂuence their future social interactions,
despite procedural guarantees to the contrary.
Thus, we argue that the difference between the experiences of partic-
ipants in our study 3 and the other studies was not one of strictly public
versus strictly anonymous decisions. We suggest that the decision-
making mechanisms of our participants do not evaluate a dichotomy be-
tween anonymous andpublic, but a probabilistic continuumof likelihoods
that the current social decision will affect future social outcomes. Com-
pared to participants in the other studies, participants in study 3 faced so-
cial decisions with greater probabilities of inﬂuencing the outcomes of
their future interactions. While this should be expected to increase coop-
eration rates (and therefore rates of cooperation predictions), we see no
clear a priori reason to think that this differencewould inﬂuence the accu-
racy of predictions (relative to chance), and thus no reason to exclude
study 3 from our meta-analysis. Nevertheless, we report results of the
meta-analysis with and without study 3.
2.2.3. Interaction structure
Table 1 summarizes differences in the structure of the interactions
between participants, during which they presumably form impressions
on which they base their predictions. Brosig's participants interacted in
pairs. In Reed et al. (2012), each player had three consecutive paired in-
teractions. Frank et al.'s participants interacted in groups of three before
each player predicted the decisions of the other two. In our ﬁrst study,
interactions occurred in groups of size three or four; our second study
included only groups of three; our third study included groups of
three and pairs. The amount of time for the interactions varied as well.
Our designs reﬂected trade-offs between the quality of interaction
provided to participants and the quantity of prediction data that can
be collected under constraints. A reasonable hypothesis about the rela-
tionship between interaction structure and predictive accuracy is that
accuracy will be greater when groups are smaller and when interaction
time is longer, i.e. when the interactions are less diluted. Indeed, this
was how Frank et al. explained the greater predictive accuracy in their
study compared to a study involving much larger groups. That speciﬁc
hypothesis can be tested in future work. Here, we simply assess predic-
tive accuracy among people who interacted for 10 to 30 minutes in
groups of four players or fewer.
2.3. Analysis
Our dependent variable, accuracy of a binary prediction, is dichoto-
mous, so we use the odds ratio as our measure of effect size. Odds
ratio values range between 0 and ∞. An OR= 1would indicate no asso-
ciation between prediction and actual decision; whereas an OR N 1
would indicate above-chance prediction accuracy. For example, an
OR = 2 would be interpreted to mean that the odds of a guesser
predicting cooperation when playing with a cooperator was two times
greater than the odds of a guesser predicting cooperation when playing
with a defector.
Most PDG predictions were nonindependent because individuals
provided multiple responses and also participated in groups. Thus, we
use a generalized estimating equation (GEE) approach to account for
the clustering of data. We report the adjusted odds ratios and 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals of our data and Brosig's (2002), and we also report a
meta-analysis (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) that combines the results of
our studies with those of Frank et al. (1993), Brosig (2002), and Reed
et al. (2012).
As in previous work, data from participants who promised to defect
was eliminated. Such promises are highly credible, and in all knowncases their partners correctly predicted defection. Including such data
would raise estimates of accuracy.
2.3.1. Data clusters and model selection.
In our studies the prediction data were clustered at two nested
levels: the level of the individual who made predictions, and the level
of the group in which individuals participated. In groups of three, each
individual would have made two predictions and two game decisions
(one for each of the other players). Given this, we generated two alter-
native models where data were clustered by: (1) guessers within
groups, and (2) players within groups. In Brosig's study the data were
clustered at one level: the individual who played the game, which can
be similarly speciﬁed in terms of guessers and players. We use the
quasilikelihood under the independence model criterion (QIC; Pan, 2001)
to select between models.
2.3.2. Study-level analyses and meta-analysis
2.3.2.1. Study. For eachof our three studies, and also for our re-analysis of
Brosig's data, we estimated the QIC for two models identiﬁed above,
using the qic command in Stata (Cui, 2007; StataCorp, 2013). We select
the model with the lowest value for parameter estimation. Next, we
perform GEE on the selected models to estimate an odds ratio and con-
ﬁdence intervals describing prediction accuracy. For this we use the
xtgee command in Stata; we specify the covariance structure as ex-
changeable and use the robust (“sandwich”) variance estimator to ob-
tain adjusted conﬁdence intervals.
2.3.2.2. Meta-analysis.We use themeta command in Stata, entering the
estimated log-odds and the standard errors of the log-odds from each
study. We assign weights based on the inverse of the estimates' vari-
ance, such that greater weight is given to studies with less statistical
noise, and the variance of the pooled effect estimate is minimized. We
use a random-effects model; we test for the heterogeneity of studies
to conﬁrm or disconﬁrm this decision and report the Q and I2 statistics
(Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-Martínez, & Botella, 2006).
3. Results
Our data are publicly available (Sparks, Burleigh, & Barclay, 2015).
3.1. Study-level analyses
3.1.1. Model selection
The Playermodel is preferred in study 1, whereas theGuessermodel
is preferred in studies 2 and 3 and for Brosig's data (Table 2).
3.1.2. Predictive accuracy
Our studies 2 and 3, and Brosig's data provided evidence of above-
chance predictive accuracy (study 2: OR = 2.19; CI = 1.034 to 4.637;
Study 3: OR = 4.001; CI = 1.685 to 9.5; Brosig: OR = 2.582; CI =
1.668 to 3.999). Using rules-of-thumb (Chen, Cohen, & Chen, 2010), the
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whereas the effect in study 3 was large (OR N 3.47).
Study 1 did not provide any evidence of above-chance predictive ac-
curacy (OR = 0.903; CI = 0.471 to 1.729).
3.1.3. Analysis of acquainted participants.
We conducted a separate analysis of acquainted participant subsam-
ples from study 1 and Brosig (2002). These observations were not re-
peated and thus nonindependence was not an issue. The small sample
sizes made calculations of the OR impossible, so we computed the per-
centage accuracy instead and compared it to chance accuracy, as in
Frank et al. (1993) and Brosig (2002). We also re-computed the GEE
models for each study with acquainted participants removed.
In study 1, we found no evidence of above-chance accuracy for
acquainted participants (70% accuracy, CI = 49.4% to 90.6%; chance
accuracy = 74.5%). This is consistent with the previous OR estimate
for study 1. With these participants removed from the GEE model, the
OR estimate changed only slightly (OR = 1.024, CI = 0.459 to 2.281);
if anything the accuracy was slightly higher with the acquainted partic-
ipants removed. This suggests that the above-chance accuracy observed
in studies 2 and 3 was unlikely to be caused solely by the inclusion of
acquainted participants. Our re-analysis of acquainted participants in
Brosig (2002) revealed perfect accuracy (100%). However, because the
subsample was a small minority of the overall sample, removing these
participants from the GEE model reduced the OR estimate only slightly
(OR = 2.343, CI = 1.508 to 3.64).
3.2. Meta-analysis
A test for the heterogeneity of studies was signiﬁcant (Q= 23.773,
p b 0.001; I2 = 78.968, p b 0.001), which supports our decision to use
a random effects model.
When the results of our three studies are combined with those ob-
tained by Frank et al. (1993), Brosig (2002), and Reed et al. (2012),
the effect for overall prediction accuracy is small and above-chance
(OR = 2.187; CI = 1.341 to 3.568). This meta-analysis is summarized
in Fig. 1. Removing study 3 from this analysis decreases the OR slightly
(OR = 1.990, CI = 1.189 to 3.332).
4. Discussion
4.1. Summary
Data showing that people can explicitly predict the behavior of
others is important for functional research into the mechanisms of im-
pression formation and personality judgment, and meets an elusive
“gold standard” for evidence of accuracy of personality judgments
(Funder, 2012). We investigated the accuracy of predictions ofFig. 1. Forest plot—marker size indicates a study's weight in the combined estimate.behaviors of clear adaptive signiﬁcance: incentivized cooperative social
decisions,made by actors aboutwhomwehave limited information and
who have incentive to deceive us.
Replicating underappreciated earlier work (Frank et al., 1993;
Brosig, 2002; Reed et al, 2012), we conducted three studies in which
participants were asked to predict the PDG decisions of other players
following a brief face-to-face interaction. The combined results of all
studies conﬁrm the previously-reported results: people can accurately
predict a social decision of a person who has incentive to mislead
them. There is no evidence that this above-chance accuracy is driven
by especially-accurate predictions of previously-acquainted partici-
pants, though this issue deserves further study.We also found some ev-
idence that participants were more conﬁdent in their accurate
predictions (Supplement). Can we ﬁguratively “see inside” (Vogt et al.,
2013) the minds of others? Yes.4.2. Applications and future directions
What are the limits of our ability to see inside? Frank et al. (1993)
suggested that predictions are likely to be more accurate after higher-
quality interactions, such as when groups are smaller. Tentatively
supporting this argument, the only study in our meta-analysis that did
not provide evidence of predictive accuracy involved the largest groups
(Table 1). Further, predictions about the decisions of economic game
players seem to be less accurate when methods provide an unexpected
game and/or when the “thin slice” is not a face-to-face encounter
(Kiyonari, 2010; Manson et al., 2013; Vogt et al., 2013). This difference
might be explained by such interactions being lower quality. Of course,
real-lifemeetings between strangers often occurwithout awell-deﬁned
impending cooperation/defection opportunity. Perhaps peoplemeeting
in ambiguous contexts do form accurate impressions of each other, but
on more salient dimensions than economic cooperativeness (as sug-
gested by Manson et al., 2013), such as reproductive value or availabil-
ity. Understanding how predictive accuracy is inﬂuenced by interaction
quality and context could be applied towards the study of a variety of
partner choice decisions of interest to social psychologists, such as em-
ployment and mating decisions.
Evidence of accurate prediction of social decisions under various
conditions is a step towards understanding the function of impression
formation mechanisms. A logical follow-up question is: How do predic-
tions and impressions inform the social decisions of the predictor? A
good social foraging strategy might be to attempt to identify non-
cooperative partners and avoid interacting with them entirely. Reputa-
tion information can be used this way (Barclay & Willer, 2007;
Sylwester & Roberts, 2010)—perhaps impressions from brief exposures
are used similarly.We did not invite participants to refuse to play a PDG
after their interactions, but in an open-ended debrieﬁng question we
did ask them which player they'd prefer to play an additional game
with. The results of this exploratory non-incentivized partner choice
measure are somewhat suggestive of a relationship between predic-
tions and partner choice (Supplement), but future work could investi-
gate the matter with more rigor.
We found that predictive accuracy is better than chance, but far
from perfect. There was a bias to over-predict cooperation, which
might reﬂect an error management problem whereby the costs of
exposing oneself to a non-cooperative partner are (assumed to be)
small relative to the gains of acquiring a new cooperative partner
(Delton et al., 2011). Future research could investigate whether predic-
tive accuracy and errors are inﬂuenced by these types of functional cost-
beneﬁt trade-offs. Improved understanding of when and why we can
accurately predict behavior can in turn inform the study of memory or
other down-stream social psychology phenomena. For example, when
defectors are not initially detected or avoided, it is perhaps best to re-
member them and avoid further interaction (Barclay, 2008; Barclay &
Lalumière, 2006).
215A. Sparks et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 37 (2016) 210–216Finally, the results of ourmodel selection analysismay inform inves-
tigations of how predictive accuracy is inﬂuenced by cheater detection
skill (i.e. good guessing) and effective signalling of cooperative intent
(Manson et al., 2013; Reed et al., 2012). The only study in which a
guesser-clustered model was not more informative was our study 1,
where there was no evidence of predictive accuracy. This tentatively
suggests that cheater detection based on cues of defection intent may
be a more important factor than signaling cooperative intent.
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